Tales from the Hairy Bottle

It's a sad and beautiful world

Thursday, March 31, 2005

President Bush's comments on the sad passing of Terri Schiavo eloquently display the hypocrisy of the man and his government:-

I urge all those who honor Terri Schiavo to continue to work to build a culture of life where all Americans are welcomed and valued and protected, especially those who live at the mercy of others.

The essence of civilization is that the strong have a duty to protect the weak.

In cases where there are serious doubts and questions, the presumption should be in the favor of life.

Monday, March 28, 2005

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has had a good time of it recently. In spite of his vehement protests against the Iraq invasion, this cloud has yielded Venezuela a significant silver lining. With America's attention and resources focused firmly on the Middle East and oil revenues at record levels, he has been free to develop his populist agenda, consolidate relations with his politically like-minded neighbours, and procure new military hardware from around the globe. It seems, however, that Washington is now turning its withering gaze back to its own back yard.

Firstly, during her inaugural hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Condoleezza Rice referred to Chavez as a "negative force" in the region. Then, while on a recent visit to Brazil, Donald Rumsfeld questioned the motives behind Venezuela's purchase of 100,000 AK-47 assault rifles from Russia, with an implication that the arms could be made for sale to guerrilla groups such as the FARC in Colombia. Chavez claims they are merely upgrading the weapons of Venezuela's armed forces, but additional orders for helicopters and fighter jets suggest that the move is more of an all-round step-up in military strength. The American right-wing press are further portraying Chavez's relationship with Fidel Castro as a Latin American Axis of Evil. Chavez is doing nothing to discourage such analogies by doing deals with and openly expressing support for other 'outposts of tyranny' such as Iran.

Another concerning development from an American standpoint is Chavez's recent policy of diversifying the export market for Venezuelan oil. Up to now, the US has taken a share of around 60 percent of Venezuela's oil exports, giving the Washington a tight grip on Chavez's purse strings. However, following recent deals with France, China and India, Venezuela's oil export market suddenly looks far more balanced. Chavez is now in a position to make credible threats of stopping supplies of oil to the US if they try to intervene in Venezuelan politics, and is already making noises to this effect.

The worst case scenario for Washington is that, with money and arms, Chavez could put himself in a position to support and encourage the devopment of a bloc of socialist countries in the region. Many already have left-wing governments, while Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru will hold presidential elections in 2006. Chavez may be hoping to inspire a chain of leftist victories across Latin America, a domino effect similar to that which George Bush dreams of in the Middle East.

However, I feel that a more likely scenario is that Chavez is using the good times to bolster his own security. He has powerful enemies both within and outside the country. The Venezuelan media is unanimously against him, as are the majority of unions and business interests. And yet he has survived two elections, a failed coup attempt and a no-confidence referendum. In all cases it is the poor and downtrodden majority who have seen him through. Christian Parenti outlines why in this week's Nation:

Despite Chávez's often radical discourse, the government has not engaged in mass expropriations of private fortunes, even agricultural ones, nor plowed huge sums into new collectively owned forms of production. In fact, private property is protected in the new Constitution promulgated after Chávez came to power. What the government has done is spend billions on new social programs, $3.7 billion in the past year alone. As a result, 1.3 million people have learned to read, millions have received medical care and an estimated 35-40 percent of the population now shops at subsidized, government-owned supermarkets. Elementary school enrollment has increased by more than a million, as schools have started offering free food to students. The government has created several banks aimed at small businesses and cooperatives, redeployed part of the military to do public works and is building several new subway systems around the country. To boost agricultural production in a country that imports 80 percent of what it consumes, Chávez has created a land-reform program that rewards private farmers who increase productivity and punishes those who do not with the threat of confiscation.

The government has also structured many of its social programs in ways that force communities to organize. To gain title to barrio homes built on squatted land, people must band together as neighbors and form land committees. Likewise, many public works jobs require that people form cooperatives and then apply for a group contract. Cynics see these expanding networks of community organizations as nothing more than a clientelist electoral machine. Rank-and-file Chavistas call their movement "participatory democracy," and the revolution's intellectuals describe it as a long-term struggle against the cultural pathologies bred by all resource-rich economies--the famous "Dutch disease," in which the oil-rich state is expected to dole out services to a disorganized and unproductive population.


But these people can only defend Chavez up to a point. He has recently stated his fears that his life is in danger from US-sponsored assassins, and Venezuelan government officials have claimed that American troops are building up on the island of Curacao. The thought of a full-blown invasion is absurd, but a peace-keeping force in the wake of a coup d'etat may not be out of the question. It has already been admitted that the CIA were in the know about the coup attempt in 2002, but the information was not passed on to the Venezuelan authorities. Who is to say that next time a more active role will be taken by the US to secure the desired outcome?

Chavez's belief that it is only a matter of time before the US comes to get him in one way or another is therefore quite understandable, as is his desire to use the current windfalls to purchase acquire some military and economic security (although perhaps a few IED's and some copies of the Koran would be a more effective deterrent at this time). The US reaction, though, merits some consideration. Chavez is a democratically elected leader. In spite of the opposition to him from many powerful circles in Venezuela he has taken very few steps to clamp down on his detractors. Many of those behind the coup two years ago still walk free and hold key positions in the country. Chavez is doing no more than acting in what he perceives as the best interests of his country and those who have brought him into power. And yet Washington would (and probably will at some point) support a coup d'etat against the wishes of the majority of Venezuelans to depose this democratically elected ruler. Other oil-producing wannabe democracies should take note.

Sunday, March 27, 2005

George Bush's nomination of Paul Wolfowitz to be the next head of the World Bank has caused more than a little consternation.

Personally, I can't see what all the fuss is about. The World Bank and Mr Wolfowitz seem to me to be perfectly suited to each other. The way in which the story is being reported in many places would suggest that Mr Wolfowitz's appointment will introduce a worm into a paradise of Third World development enthusiasts. In reality the World Bank is already a fairly big can of worms. Let's consider the fears of Mr Wolfowitz's detractors in more detail:

Firstly, there is the fear that he may impose a neo-liberal trade and fiscal agenda on the Third World, forcing countries into large scale privatisation, making them liberalise trade such that local businesses can no longer compete, and scaling back 'big government' measures such as social insurance and healthcare policies. The only problem with this fear is that the World Bank have been proponents of such policies for decades, forcing the hands of needy countries into becoming guinea pigs in the most extreme of economic experiments.

In the wake of the fall of the Iron Curtain, plane-loads of eager World Bank sponsored economists set up shop in the Eastern Bloc, plying their snake oil policies in the hope of finally seeing what all of those formulas on the Economics Department blackboard would turn into in the real world. The answer was economic disaster, poverty and hunger for millions and the ruin of the nascent post-Soviet private sector. A similar nightmare has been wrought in Sub-Saharan Africa. Johann Hari gives the following example:-

...in Zambia, the World Bank demanded that the state stop paying for health and education out of general taxation. As aid agencies had warned, infant mortality -- a neat euphemism for the number of dead babies -- piled ever upward. Average life expectancy fell from 54 to 40. Of course, there were other factors in this expanding Zambian graveyard, but few experts deny the bank played a key role.

And -- even though the bank claims periodically to have learned from these deadly mistakes -- the policies continue, barely altered, today. The bank has shown time and again that it is more interested in debt repayment, neoliberal ideology and opportunities for transnational corporations than in ending poverty. This isn't because its executives are personally malicious; many of them honestly believe that short-term austerity leads to long-term gain. They continue to believe this because they are marinated in a hard-line ideology that is impervious to evidence.


This is not a purely anecdotal case. According to The Center For Economic Justice, between 1960 and 1980, before the World Bank introduced its neo-Liberal prescriptions, average incomes in Africa increased by 34% in Africa and 73% in Latin America. In the 25 years since the "structural adjustment" policies started being actively implemented in 1980, there has been a fall of 20% in Africa and a rise of only 7% in Latin America.

Another accusation pointed at Mr Wolfowitz is that he will continue in the grand tradition of his previous employer, and exploit his new position to find opportunities to promote American business, particularly in the fields of energy and defence. Once again, the activities of Mr Wolfowitz's predecessors will make it difficult for him to make a name for himself in this area. Johann Hari again:

In 2000, after megatons of pressure from democratic movements in the developing world and their left-wing supporters in the West, the World Bank was finally forced to undertake a review of its energy policies. It did its best to rig it, putting Emil Salim in charge. Salim was the former energy minister of the corporation-loving Indonesian dictator Gen. Suharto, and he was even serving on the board of a coal company at the time he was appointed. But -- to everyone's astonishment -- Salim concluded that supporting oil and gas projects doesn't help poverty, damages the environment disastrously and should be stopped altogether by 2008.

The bank's response? It simply ignored its own report. Nadia Martinez, an expert on the World Bank with the Institute for Policy Studies, believes this scandal reveals the true nature of the bank today. "The World Bank has repeatedly proved itself to be more concerned with the needs of oil companies than with the impoverished people it officially serves. It will not distinguish its goals and standards from the likes of Halliburton, ExxonMobil, Shell and other profit-driven institutions."

The bank feebly responds by saying that developing countries need more energy, but it knows perfectly well that 82 percent of the oil and gas being mined by its projects is going straight to the United States and Europe.


Finally, one has to look at Mr Wolfowitz's role in the promotion and planning of the Iraq War as evidence of his militaristic rather than economic attitude towards solving problems. Certainly he has more experience in making poor people history rather than making poverty history, as tens of thousands of dead Iraqi civilians would testify. However, I'm not sure his role in the planning of the Iraq invasion and his 'misunderestimations' of the bloody aftermath are so relevant to his suitability for this appointment. My view is that he is a radical who will take radical steps to change things. I think his primary professional goal is to use American power to bring democracy and freedom to the world (yes, I honestly do!). In the World Bank, the power at his command will be economic power. How much worse a job can he do with these tools than his forebears who have broken plenty of eggs but ended up with no omelettes.

Similarly, his lack of experience seems to be a red herring. According to World Bank historian Sebastian Mallaby, Wolfowitz is, in a historical context, one of the more suitable candidates for the job:-

"I can tell you with some confidence that this guy has more experience in development than just about any other World Bank president when he first started. Some of the people who have been picked by the United States in the past have been totally, utterly unqualified, had no knowledge whatsoever of development."

As a final thought however, the long term solution is surely to end the outmoded, 'white men's club' method of choosing leaders of the IMF and the World Bank. Under the current system it is a pipe dream to think of Bush nominating someone with radically different views to himself, and the relative merits of the Wolfowitz nomination need to be considered in this context. However, a broader selection system could yield any number of more suitable candidates. Jesse Jackson has suggested that the developing nations nominate their own candidate this weekend as a protest against the Euro-US monopoly. Such measures should be taken, and be taken seriously by those currently pulling the strings. To assert the right to invade other sovereign countries in the name of democracy while retaining autocratic control of the international financial aid organisations stinks not only of hypocrisy, but of corruption too. If Paul Wolfowitz is serious about global democracy and freedom, the first thing he will do upon taking up his new role will be to ensure that the selection process for his successor is made to be transparent, independent and open to candidates from all countries.

Saturday, March 26, 2005

Mahmoud Abu Rideh is considered so dangerous by the British Government that it was considered imperative to keep him in a high security prison for three years without trial, not even informing him of the crime of which he was accused.

He is a man considered so dangerous that the Government has now forced through legislation casting aside 800 year-old liberties in order to secure the right to hold him, and those of his dangerous ilk, under house arrest or otherwise monitor his actions.

Under the terms of a control order stemming from this legislation, Mr Abu Rideh was released two weeks ago, not from prison, but from the high-security mental hospital to which he had been transferred due to the deterioration in his mental condition during the three years of his internment. Within days of being released he was admitted to hospital having taken an overdose. He claimed that he could not cope with the confusion and stress of trying to comply with the Kafka-esque requirements of the order, which the authorities have clearly tweaked as problems have arisen. The speed with which our civil liberties have been sold down the river left no time in which to think through in advance how these control orders could be practically imlemented.

As an illustration of this unpreparedness another of the released detainees found himself taken directly from prison to a premises without food, money or a phone. Given the lack of clarity over the restrictions, all he could do was hope that someone would turn up to help him, unsure whether he would be arrested if he went outside. He had to wait sixteen hours before help arrived.

Last Wednesday Mr Abu Rideh walked alone and unnanounced into the offices of The Guardian to inform them of the curious conditions under which he lives his new life. These restrictions include the following:-

· He is not allowed to make arrangements to meet anybody, but he can drop in to see anyone if he does so unannounced [presumably this is why The Guardian didn't know he was coming];

· He cannot attend any pre-arranged meetings or gatherings, but was present at the anti-war demonstration at Hyde Park last Saturday. He says he stumbled across it while playing football in the park with his children;

· He is banned from having visitors to his home unless they are vetted in advance, but he is allowed to arrange to attend group prayers at a mosque;

· He thinks he is being followed on the tube, but if he calls a taxi, no one tails him.


He can go out during the day, subject to the above rules, but must be back by 7pm. He wears an electronic tag at all times to monitor his movements. However, as The Yorkshire Ranter has pointed out, the tagging and monitoring systems are so rudimentary as to be a minor inconvenience for anyone with serious ill-intent on their mind.

The current situation is one which can leave no-one satisfied. If any of these men are as dangerous as the government claims, they will be highly amused by the quaint methods being used to track their movements. The control orders implicitly assume that the suspects are a hybrid of Mr Hyde and Cinderella, shiny happy people by day who transform into dangerous fanatical terrorists by night. During the day how difficult would it be for a determined and organised international terrorist organisation to ensure that an agent 'bumps into' the detainee if information needed to be passed? Mr Abu Rideh claims not to have been tailed by car anyway, so given that the tags simply detect whether he is at home or not, whoever he rubs shoulders with during the day is a matter of conjecture.

In any case, all this is almost certainly immaterial. Even if these people were dangerous at some point, they are now thoroughly compromised as potential terrorist agents. What would it say about Al Qaeda's 'strength in depth' if they had not been able to put in place new, more discreet operatives within the last three years? The chances of those subject to the control orders being involved in future terrorist activities are virtually zero.

However, in a situation where these people have no opportunity to prove their innocence, I can't see how they will ever have these control orders removed. What would be the basis for such a reversal? There are no grounds for appeal as there has been no trial. Any good behaviour would be seen as a success of the restrictions rather than evidence of a miscarriage of justice. If any of those subject to these orders are innocent they will never have a chance to prove it, and are doomed to a life of surveillance and suspicion.

But it is not just the wrongly accused who suffer under this legislation. We all now live under the threat of wrongful arrest and unquestioned process through the system into a holding pattern of house-arrest, kurfew and surveillance. Of course, none of us think it will happen to us. Gerry Conlon didn't, but even with the benefit of a trial, he still found himself and his friends and family subject to a pre-meditated miscarriage of justice.

How much easier it will be to secure a conviction under the new system. How much more tempting it will be for the forces of law and order to put the finger on someone who will never have the chances to defend themselves in a court of law. How ironic that a mere month after acknowledging the propensity for our judicial system to deliver such unsafe verdicts in his apology to Mr Conlon, that Tony Blair would railroad such dangerous legislation through Parliament, defying the weight of our judiciary who found themselves fighting valiantly but vainly to protect liberties so deeply ingrained that they go to the heart of what it means to be British.

Wednesday, March 23, 2005

The causes of the First World War have always been a favourite subject of history teachers. I remember fighting off sleep in my own school days, desperately trying to understand how some nutter blowing up an Archduke in Sarajevo could set in motion a chain of events leading inexorably to ‘The War To End All Wars’, which was in turn a major contributing factor to the Great Depression, which subsequently set the scene for the ‘War After The War To End All Wars’. Niall Ferguson, Harvard and Oxford professor and leading historical author, believes the economic and geo-political dominoes are in place for a 21st Century Sarajevo event to potentially plunge the world back into chaos.

Although Ferguson’s views are often controversial, he is no leftist radical. He was in favour of the invasion of Iraq, encourages the US to be more interventionist on the world stage, and characterises Europe as a power well beyond its sell-by date. However, he is no apologist for the Bush regime and is critical of many aspects of US policy. He lays out his causes for concern in the current edition of Foreign Affairs. The article is reprinted at truthout.org.

Ferguson argues that the United States, just like the British Empire in 1914, is dangerously overstretched. Militarily, there are neither the troop numbers nor the public support in the US for the level of intervention necessary to meet the Bush administration’s ambitious aims. From a financial point of view the country’s enormous and rising deficits greatly limit any room for manoeuvre in the event of any new and greater catastrophe which may be around the corner.

He uses China’s threats against Taiwan as an example. As China grows economically so does its temptation to flex its military muscles. Taiwan has long been regarded with envious eyes by Beijing. American pledges of support for Taiwan have up to now put a powerful brake on this ambition, but China’s leading role in financing the US deficit and supporting the dollar have left them in control of vast dollar reserves. Flooding the market with these reserves would cause the dollar to plummet, leading to spiralling interest rates and a depression in the US which would inevitably spread throughout the world. This puts Washington’s testicles firmly in Chinese hands. It is argued by some that this threat is tempered by Chinese reliance on the American market for its goods, but Ferguson argues that an economic or political crisis in China may tip the balance in favour of reckless but populist action against Taiwan.

In the early 20th Century Britain’s widespread global commitments meant that there was insufficient resources at home to successfully deter German ambitions in continental Europe. The resulting conflict sealed the fate of the British Empire. The US could similarly find itself unable to credibly deter the exploits of its real future rivals for global hegemony, as it wades deeper into the quagmire of the Middle East, preferring to ask foreign rival powers to bankroll its adventures rather than domestic tax payers.

Would the US’s traditional allies step in to help out? It would depend on the circumstances of course, but any Euro-US alliance would appear less likely in the wake of America’s snubbing of international institutions in the run-up to the Iraq invasion. A coalition of the willing against Iran would almost certainly lack British support this time, and Europe’s ambitions to sell arms to China sheds light on potential European ambivalence in future Sino-American rivalries.

Finally Ferguson considers the threat from global terrorism. He compares bin Laden and al Qaeda to the Lenin and the Bolsheviks, pointing out the dangers of an Islamist government with al Qaeda sympathies coming to power in the Middle East, in Saudi Arabia for example. He also points to al Qaeda’s unquestionable success already in contributing to the American deficit problem:

In a proclamation to the world before the recent U.S. presidential election, bin Laden declared that his "policy [was] bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy." As he explained, "al Qaeda spent $500,000 on the [September 11 attacks], while America, in the incident and its aftermath, lost--according to the lowest estimate--more than $500 billion. Meaning that every dollar of al Qaeda defeated a million dollars, by the permission of Allah." Bin Laden went on to talk about the U.S. "economic deficit ... estimated to total more than a trillion dollars" and to make a somewhat uncharacteristic joke:

[T]hose who say that al Qaeda has won against the administration in the White House or that the administration has lost in this war have not been precise, because when one scrutinizes the results, one cannot say that al Qaeda is the sole factor in achieving those spectacular gains. Rather, the policy of the White House that demands the opening of war fronts to keep busy their various corporations--whether they be working in the field of arms or oil or reconstruction--has helped al Qaeda to achieve these enormous results.


Ferguson’s conclusions are hardly heartwarming:-

We all know that another, bigger September 11 is quite likely; it is, indeed, bin Laden's stated objective. We all know--or should know--that a crisis over Taiwan would send huge shockwaves through the international system; it could even lead to a great-power war. We all know that revolutionary regime change in Saudi Arabia would shake the world even more than the 1917 Bolshevik coup in Russia. We all know that the detonation of a nuclear device in London would dwarf the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand as an act of terrorism.

But what exactly can we do about such contingencies, if, as with the Asian tsunami, we cannot say even approximately when they might occur? The opportunity cost of liquidating our portfolios and inhabiting a subterranean bunker looks too high, even if Armageddon could come tomorrow. In that sense, we seem no better prepared for the worst-case scenario than were the beneficiaries of the last age of globalization, 90 years ago. Like the passengers who boarded the Lusitania, all we know is that we may conceivably sink. Still we sail.


He offers no proposals for how to improve or rectify the situation. His attitude seems to be to ‘cross our fingers and hope for the best’ – to shell out for our deck chairs on the Lusitania and enjoy the view while it lasts.

And yet surely there are things which can be done. Firstly, the US must realistically reflect on the range of options currently available:-

1. Take a genuinely unilateral route, asking Americans to fund the necessary level of expenditure to play the role of omnipresent interventionist world superpower, and recruit sufficient military personnel to carry out the role, ie. implement the draft.

2. Carry on in the current theme, with the understanding that the deficit between large global ambition and small government is being in the thrall to whoever is supporting your currency and deficit, and the understanding that you may not have control over whoever has you by the balls in future. Surely this somewhat undermines the whole Global Unilateral Hyperpower argument in any case. Alternatively, balance the budget by slashing those annoying ‘big government’ responsibilities such as Medicare and social security.

3. Work for consensus with other allies, on the basis of which global burdens can be shared and common enemies can be faced together – a common front of democracies with the resources to offer a credible threat of military intervention as and when required, and the use of soft power where appropriate.

Sometimes even the richest of beggars have to admit that they can’t always be choosers. The US is in a strong enough position to ensure that other allies will need to make significant compromises as part of any consensus. This should provide sufficient grounds for progress, and is surely preferable to the first option, which will certainly be unpalatable to the American electorate, and the second which puts the US in the thrall of a potentially far less palatable partner.

In reality I’m sure we have a long way to go before this issue is resolved. In spite of the talk of building bridges, actions speak louder of a continued spirit of unilateralism. The nomination of Paul Wolfowitz to the World Bank was always going to be unpopular with everyone outside the neocon cliques, and European negotiations with Iran continue to be treated with disdain.

Ferguson’s writing is often sprinkled with hyperbole. He once commented on the merits of Scottish devolution that it may ultimately break up the Union and spark civil war with England. However, the logical conclusion of the points he makes in this particular article, that America’s current overstretch puts it in a position which is ultimately bound to become untenable, is hard to disregard.

Sunday, March 20, 2005

Name some songs with numbers in the title. That was the innocent challenge thrown down by A Small Victory on Friday.

Fair enough I thought - I added some suggestions of my own to the impressive list of comments which had been put forward. Coming back later, I noticed that a good many of the numbers from 1 to 100 had been covered, and thought that with a bit of effort I could probably think of a few more which could be added. This tempted my mind into a direction which was destined to ruin my weekend. With so many numbers already accounted for, would it be possible to compile a list of songs containing all of the numbers from 1 to 100?

I was fairly sure that the answer would be 'Yes', but the challenge would be to try to do so while at the same time trying to ensure that the tracks suggested, or at least the artists, were familiar to those with an interest in music. In my efforts to achieve this, the choice of tracks has inevitably been biased by my own tastes in certain cases. I tried to avoid cop-outs, short-cuts and cheats in my suggestions. Some may question some of the proposals. I would only say that I would welcome any constructive criticism in the form of suggestions for improvements to the list.

My initial entries were based on the 'A Small Victory' list, which I then amended and expanded based on my own resources. I have to admit that this still left me short of about 30 numbers, but by this time I couldn't stop short of my target, so I hunted down the remaining numbers from the internet (principally allmusic.com). You may wish to have a go yourself before looking at my list.

The results are as follows:-

One - U2
Two Out of Three Ain't Bad - Meat Loaf
Three Times A Lady - The Commodores
Four Sticks - Led Zeppelin
Five Years - David Bowie
If Six Was Nine - Jimi Hendrix
Seven Seconds - Youssou N'Dour with Neneh Cherry
Eight Miles High - The Byrds
Revolution #9 - The Beatles
Ten Years Gone - Led Zeppelin
11 O'Clock Tick Tock - U2
12:51 - The Strokes
Thirteen - Big Star
14 Years - Guns 'N Roses
TVC15 - David Bowie
Happy Birthday, Sweet Sixteen - Neil Sedaka
17 Seconds - The Cure
Eighteen - Alice Cooper
19th Nervous Breakdown - Rolling Stones
20th Century Boy - Marc Bolan & T-Rex
21st Century Schizoid Man - King Crimson
22 Acacia Avenue - Iron Maiden
57th Minute of the 23rd Hour - Galliano
24 Hours from Tulsa - Gene Pitney
25th Floor - Patti Smith
26-2 - John Coltrane
7:27 - The Adicts
28 - Steppenwolf
29 Palms - Robert Plant
Thirty Days - Chuck Berry
Route 31 - Champion Jack Dupree
32-20 Blues - Robert Johnson
Thirty-Three - Smashing Pumpkins
#34 - Dave Matthews
Rainy Day Women #12 and #35 - Bob Dylan
36 Degrees - Placebo
Do What We're Told (Milgram's 37) = Peter Gabriel
Epic (#38) - Grace Slick
'39 - Queen
40 - U2
American Skin (41 Shots) - Bruce Springsteen
42nd Street - Diana Krall
Hymn 43 - Jethro Tull
Forty-Four - Howling Wolf
5:45 - Gang of Four
46 + 2 - Tool
47 - Sunny Day Real Estate
4:48 Psychosis - Tindersticks
49 Bye Byes - Crosby, Stills & Nash
50 Ways To Leave Your Lover - Paul Simon
Highway 51 - Bob Dylan
52 Girls - B-52's
53rd and 3rd - The Ramones
54 Duncan Terrace - Allan Holdsworth
Ol'55 - Tom Waits
56 Hope Road - Sugar Ray
57 Channels (and Nothin' On) - Bruce Springsteen
Poem 58 - Chicago
59th Bridge Street Song - Simon & Garfunkel
C30, C60, C90, Go! - Bow, Wow, Wow
Highway 61 Revisited - Bob Dylan
Rocket Reducer No. 62 (Rama Lama Fa Fa Fa) - MC5
My '63 - Neko Case with the Sadies
When I'm 64 - The Beatles
Thunder Kiss '65 - White Zombie
Route 66 - Chuck Berry
Questions 67 and 68 - Chicago
68 Guns - The Alarm
Summer of '69 - Bryan Adams
Beat 70 - Pat Metheny Group
Down '71 (The Getaway) - Bone-Thugs-N-Harmony
Emergency 72 - Turin Brakes
Arlington 73 - Crass
Teenage Lament '74 - Alice Cooper
'74-'75 - The Connells
Spirit of '76 - The Alarm
Blizzard of '77 - Nada Surf
78 Stone Wobble - Gomez
Pieces of 79 & 15 - The Strawbs
80 - Green Day
Eighty-One - Miles Davis
Does This Bus Stop at 82nd Street? - Bruce Springsteen
Apathy 83 - Ian Hunter
New Gold Dream (81-82-83-84) - Simple Minds
Alive in 85 - Broken Social Scene
86 - Green Day
'87 And Cry - David Bowie
88 - Sum 41
Pop Song 89 - REM
Route 90 - Los Lobos
Freedom '91 - New Model Army
Palomar '92 - The Rheostatics
93 'til Infinity - Souls of Mischief
94 Hours - As I Lay Dying
Durango 95- The Ramones
96 Tears - ? and the Mysterians
The Wreck of the Old '97 - Johnny Cash
Fantasy 98 - Geroge Michael
99 Red Balloons - Nena
100 Years Ago - The Rolling Stones